The Chinese aircraft carrier that began sea trials last week is by far the largest warship of any country in Asia and in certain realms could give China game-changing capabilities. However, the carrier cannot help China assert sovereignty over the South China Sea - its biggest maritime headache - and the ship could prove to be more of a diplomatic liability than a military asset.

At 300 meters long and displacing over 60,000 tons, the carrier is by far the largest warship of any navy in Asia. No other country in the region can operate fighter aircraft from a warship except Thailand, whose Chakri Narubet is less than a fifth the size. Once fully operational, the Chinese carrier should be able to sustain up to 40 Sukhoi 33-derived J-15 naval air-superiority fighters and up to 20 rotary aircraft, including Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopters.

On the surface, this capability would seem to decisively shift the balance of power in the South China Sea, where China has territorial disputes with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Currently, China claims its territorial waters skirt the Philippines' coast as far south as Brunei, on Borneo island, before looping north and hugging the Vietnamese coast back to southern China. This 80-year-old claim neatly encompasses the Spratly and Paracel island reefs, assumed to be rich in hydrocarbon resources by surrounding countries that have erected research installations on them.

With an operational carrier based at China's expanded naval facility at Sanya on Hainan Island, China could conceivably maintain local air superiority over any point in the disputed South China Sea - a precondition for decisive military or diplomatic efforts to enforce its maritime claim and force the withdrawal of rival commercial operations and installations from the islands.

This capability would also help China reduce other countries' enthusiasm for the frequent maritime spats that occur in these contested waters and the nationalist outpourings that follow. In the latest incident in mid-June, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman accused Vietnamese exploration vessels of conducting unlawful oil and gas surveys off the Spratly archipelago, harassing Chinese fishing vessels and "gravely violating China's sovereignty and maritime rights".

Despite Chinese defense officials claims that the new carrier is intended for scientific research and training, the ship clearly fulfills a strategic function. The official Xinhua news agency published a commentary shortly before the ship departed saying, "Building a strong navy that is commensurate with China's rising status is a necessary step, and an inevitable choice for the country to safeguard its increasingly globalized national interests."

However, even if it becomes operational, the carrier and its air groups will be hugely vulnerable and China is unlikely to risk using it in any confrontation with rivals in the South China Sea.

Without catapults or arrester wires, the carrier will not be able to operate any airborne early-warning aircraft needed to provide comprehensive radar coverage for fleets. This means the carrier will have limited area awareness, unable to see or respond to threats beyond the horizon of ship-based radar. Logistical constraints will also limit the time the carrier can spend at sea: the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) possesses only five seaworthy replenishment ships, none of them over 22,000 tons.

The biggest liability, however, will be inadequate protection. China has two Type 52C destroyers with active phased array radar that enables them to track multiple incoming missiles and aircraft - with four more under construction. But integrating that radar with China's domestically developed HHQ-9 anti-air missiles so they can shoot down supersonic sea-skimming missiles will prove exceptionally challenging. Nor can the carrier rely on sub-surface protection. Without very-low frequency radio communication systems, China's long range patrol submarines would struggle to operate tactically in defense of a carrier group.

Defensive postures

But even without these deficiencies, China's southern neighbors will likely ensure that the South China Sea becomes too dangerous for China to risk sending its prized carrier into contested waters.

In the first week of June, an article in Vietnam's state newspaper, Nhan Dan, carried pictures of the world's fastest anti-ship missile, the Indo-Russian BrahMos, in a clear statement of procurement intentions and its navy's readiness to respond to incidents of Chinese aggression within waters it claims as its exclusive economic zone. With a speed of Mach 2.8, the missile is four times as fast as a US-made Tomahawk missile and would present a lethal threat to any vessel within its 300-kilometer range. (Even with exceptional anti-missile capabilities, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies would keep well out of range of this threat.)

BrahMos procurement requires joint Indian and Russian approval, and Vietnam is rapidly improving its relations with both nations. During a high profile defense cooperation visit to New Delhi by Vietnam's navy chief at the end of June, the Vietnamese government gave permission for Indian navy ships to drop anchor at Nha Trang, which has been off-limits to foreign navies since 2003.

The offer followed an announcement on June 6 by Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh that part of the strategic Cam Ranh Bay would be made available for technical and logistical support of foreign military ships. To ensure that China properly understood the significance of that offer, the announcement was followed-up on August 14 with an unprecedented visit by senior Vietnamese government officials to the American carrier, USS George Washington, as it traversed the South China Sea.

On July 2, Vietnam also took a decisive step forward in its long-heralded defense procurement deal with Russia. According to the Russian VNA newswire, Oleg Azizov, representative of the Russian state defense export company Rosoboronexport, confirmed Vietnam has signed a contract to buy six Kilo-636 MV diesel electric submarines for delivery in 2014.

The 2,300 ton boats are optimized for shallow water operations and are exceptionally quiet running. Without leaving port, these submarines would provide a powerful deterrent to China against sending the carrier far into the South China Sea in a possible confrontation situation. Malaysia already has good submarine capabilities, with two recently commissioned French-designed Scorpene class boats.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines could also quickly develop powerful deterrent capabilities, and at relatively little cost by deploying anti-ship missiles to key outposts. Indonesia has already held discussions with India to acquire the BrahMos missile. The Philippines could either purchase US missiles off-the-shelf, or negotiate purchase of Taiwan's new ram-jet Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, unveiled with exquisite timing last week at the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition against a mural backdrop of a burning carrier.

The fact that the South China Sea will be an exceptionally dangerous environment for the carrier will present the Chinese government with an acute dilemma. The carrier is hugely popular in China, where it has been touted as a symbol of the country's ascent to great-power status. Ardent online fans have already christened the vessel Shi-Lang, after the 17th century Taiwan-conquering admiral. And the government has invested vast political and financial capital in the project, both in terms of the propaganda value of the images and the cost of naval fighters and training establishments.

But the one nautical environment where Chinese opinion is most anxious for an assertion of naval authority - the South China Sea - is the one place that Chinese admirals will almost certainly never risk launching the carrier. With this knowledge, the countries on the South China Sea's littoral have every reason to welcome the carrier program. Indeed it may even strengthen their claims, knowing that they can taunt China to send it out. In any looming confrontation, the Chinese leadership will suddenly need to explain why its totemic flagship is useless for asserting power in the country's own self-claimed territorial waters or risk seeing it reduced, almost immediately, to a flaming wreck.

Phil Radford is a freelance writer and specialist on naval strategy based in Sydney.

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